About Questions 76 - 125:
Questions 76 - 125 were taken from the 1946 Summer Term Evidence Exam of Professor Morgan of the Harvard Law School.
Before doing these questions, it may a good idea to read Fed. R. Evid. 803(3), the hearsay exception for present state of mind. You will then know that admissibility does not turn on some of the nice questions of classification that you will encounter, because even if they were hearsay, the statements would be admissible under the exception. Also, the rationale of the state of mind exception is the same as the reason often given for deeming circumstantial evidence of state of mind nonhearsay. There may be some danger of insincerity, but dangers of memory and perception are lessened. Finally, in practice a proponent will often argue that a statement is admissible "because it shows state of mind." You should know that this argument may mean either that the evidence is not hearsay because it is being offered as circumstantial evidence of state of mind, or that it is hearsay but admissible under the exception for statement of present state of mind.
For a few questions, an assertion-centered definition of hearsay (under which a statement is hearsay if it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted) arguably leads to a different result than a declarant-centered definition (under which a statement is hearsay if its value depends upon the credibility of the declarant). The answers to these questions note when there might be a different result under these different definitions. In each of the following questions concerning a statement made by D, that statement is of course made out of court.